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East Asia has experienced a dramatic decrease in 
output growth volatility over the past 20 years. This 
is good news, as output growth volatility affects poor 
households because of coping strategies that have long-
term, harmful consequences, and the overall economy 
through its negative impact on economic growth. This 
paper investigates the factors behind this long decline 
in volatility, and derives lessons about ways to mitigate 
renewed upward pressure in face of the financial crisis. 
The authors show that if, on the one hand, high trade 
openness has sustained economic growth in the past 
several decades, on the other hand, it has made countries 
This paper—a product of the Social Protection unit, East Asia and Pacific Region —is part of a larger effort in the unit to 
study main sources of vulnerability. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at jrigolini@worldbank.org.  
more vulnerable to external fluctuations. Although less 
frequent terms of trade shocks and more stable growth 
rates of trading partners have helped to reduce volatility 
in the past, the same external factors are now putting 
renewed pressure on volatility. The way forward seems 
therefore to be to counterbalance the external upward 
pressure on volatility by improving domestic factors. 
Elements under domestic control that can help countries 
deal with high volatility include more accountable 
institutions, better regulated financial markets, and more 
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1  INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Before  the  current financial crisis  hit  progressively high, middle, and low-income 
countries, the world economy was  experiencing  a  remarkable  decrease in 
macroeconomic volatility. Since the 1970s output growth volatility had steadily declined in 
almost every region of the world (Figure 1). In its 2007 World Economic Outlook the IMF 
reported that volatility had fallen progressively since its 1970s peak, from 3.8 to 2.7 percent 
of GDP.
2
                                                 
2 World Economic Outlook (2007), Globalization and Inequality, Chapter V: “The Changing Dynamics of the 
Global Business Cycle,” 
  Furthermore, the frequency of major recessions had  also diminished:  crisis 
volatility, which captures the frequency and magnitude of major recessions, declined from an 
average of more than 4 percent of total volatility at the end of the 1970s, to less than 1 
percent at the beginning of the new century. The decrease in macroeconomic volatility was 
even more significant for non-OECD East Asian countries, were volatility dropped from an 
average of 7.85 percent in the beginning of the 1970s, to an average of 2.35 percent in 2006. 
This process began at a very strong pace in the 1970s, slowed down in the 1980s and 1990s 
(a spike can be even observed during the 1997/98 financial crisis), but gained momentum 
again at the beginning of the new century driving volatility below pre-crisis levels. 
 
This is good news, as output growth volatility negatively affects in the short term poor 
households adopting detrimental coping strategies, and, in the medium term, economic 
growth. Output growth volatility reduces people’s welfare through its effect on the labor 
market, earnings, and consumption. Households, in particular poor ones, have limited 
capacity to insure against shocks. Their earnings and consumption patterns follow therefore 
closely overall macroeconomic trends, increasing in good times and decreasing in bad ones, 
and the very limited ability of these poor households to insure against shocks makes them 
often adopt coping strategies that can have long-term harmful consequences, in particular on 
future generations. Moreover, macroeconomic volatility has a negative and robust impact on 
GDP growth. Our estimates indicate that if the standard deviation of the growth rate of per 
capita GDP in East Asia would decrease from 1.4 percent (the volatility in the period 1996-
2000) to 0.9 percent (the average level observed in OECD countries over the same period), 
the growth rate would increase  by  0.48  percentage points.  Reducing volatility therefore 
improves both household welfare and economic performance. 
 
 
www.imf.org     
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Figure 1: Output growth volatility and crisis volatility, 1970-2006 
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Source: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation GDP per capita growth using a ten year window. Crisis Volatility is measured the 
portion of the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth that corresponds to downward 
deviations below the world average volatility threshold (see Box 1). Average volatilities are 
weighted by GDP. 
 
Nonetheless, volatility in East Asia remains well above OECD levels, and the current 
financial crisis  is bound to exert an upwards pressure.  The current financial crisis 
demonstrates that East Asian economies remain sensitive to external shocks. Terms of trade 
in low and middle-income countries in the region are rapidly worsening, in particular in 
commodity exporting countries, and both domestic and foreign direct investments are drying 
up, limiting the potential for domestic growth. Recent evidence and forecasts suggest that the 
downturn in East Asia will be significant and that in many countries recovery will be slow. 
Overall GDP growth in East Asia is projected to fall to 5.3 percent in 2009 (against 8 percent 
in 2008), and some countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia are 
facing negative expected growth rates. Moreover, while recessions tend to last on average 
one year, recessions such as the current one linked to Banking crises and equity busts are 
likely to last longer.
3
This study investigates factors that drove the long decline in output growth volatility in 
East Asia and the rest of the world, and derives lessons about ways to mitigate the 
impact of a more volatile international environment. Our objective is to discover the 
overriding factors that contributed to lower macroeconomic volatility in the past decades, and 
to investigate factors that could reduce it further (or at least manage the current pressure of a 
more volatile international environment). We consider both domestic factors under countries’ 
 
 
                                                 
3 World Bank East Asia and Pacific update, April 2009.      
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control, and external factors, such as the volatility of terms or trade and the volatility of 
growth of trading partners. The empirical analysis is based on a dynamic panel General 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation that corrects for unobserved effects and endogenous 
regressors, and data used cover 80 countries over the 1975-2005 period (see the Appendix for 
details). 
 
Part of the long-term  observed  decline in volatility is related to improved domestic 
fundamentals and better macroeconomic management.  Output growth volatility has 
fallen thanks to improved institutions, business practices, and other structural features that 
have enhanced the ability of East Asian economies to absorb shocks. In line with existing 
studies, we find that  the shift towards more democratic and stable institutions and the 
increased depth and sophistication of financial markets are among the structural changes that 
have contributed to increase macroeconomic stability, both in East Asia and in the rest of the 
world. The most significant contribution to the long decline in volatility stem however from 
improved macroeconomic management:  more stable fiscal policies are  robustly linked to 
lower output fluctuations, and the success of policy makers in maintaining low and steady 
inflation has driven down uncertainty, fostering investment and bringing volatility down. 
 
Part of the long-term decline in volatility is however also related to improved external 
conditions  out of countries’ control, which in face of the financial crisis are now 
exerting strong upwards pressure on volatility.  The long-term decline in volatility is also 
imputable to a decrease in the magnitude and frequency of external shocks. The study shows 
that while less frequent terms of trade shocks and more stable growth rates of trading 
partners helped reducing volatility in the past decades, these very same external factors are 
now exerting strong upwards pressure on volatility. Over the last two years world economic 
growth declined from 5.1 percent in 2007 to 3.4 percent in 2008, and is projected to fall to 
0.5 percent in 2009, its lowest rate since World War II. While the impact of these dramatic 
changes are only beginning to be captured by formal volatility measures,
4
                                                 
4 Output growth volatility is usually estimated using a 5 or 10 years rolling window, hence the full impact of the 
current financial crisis will only be captured some years from now. 
 they are bound to 
increase medium-term volatility of terms of trade and foreign growth, which, in turn, will 
affect countries’ volatility. 
 
East Asia also remains more vulnerable to external shocks because of its high openness 
to trade. Average openness to trade in East Asia (i.e. the sum of imports and exports) is 77.8 
percent of GDP, against 46.0 for OECD countries (Figure 10). The impact of trade openness 
on output growth volatility is significant: an increase of one percent in trade openness raises 
volatility by 0.7 percent. While the expansion of trade has been a key driver of economic 
growth, it has therefore  also increased East  Asia’s vulnerability to external output 
fluctuations.     
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The way forward points therefore at improving domestic  determinants of volatility 
under countries’ control, so to counterbalance the upwards pressure caused by a more 
volatile world environment  and high trade openness.  There seems  to be space for 
improvement in the areas of institutional quality, as well as monetary and fiscal policies 
(Figure 2).  The quality of institutions  across the region could, on average, be  further 
improved. It would be essential for parliaments to exert strong control over the executive, to 
prevent implementation of uncertain and discretionary policies and to avoid continuous shifts 
in fiscal policy. Furthermore, stable monetary and fiscal policies are essential instruments to 
reduce output growth volatility, and are also the areas where improvements could lead to the 
most significant drops in volatility (Figure 2). In that context, medium term monetary and 
fiscal frameworks could be adopted  to better steer these instruments and provide policy 
makers with a benchmark and a target for monetary and fiscal policies. Finally, given the 
strong impact banking crises have on crisis volatility (Table A.1),  it is vital to improve 
prudential supervision and create fast response plans for handling banking problems. 
Improved financial depth would also allow a better allocation of resources where needed, 
with a beneficial impact on volatility. 
 
Figure 2: Estimated average  reduction in volatility if factors 






















Non-OECD EAP (average of China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia 
and the Philippines) vs. average OECD levels in 2000-05. The bars 
represent the estimates’ standard deviation. Source: Author’s own 
calculations using data from WDI, IMF and Polity IV. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the impact of output growth volatility 
on poverty, welfare, and economic growth. Sections 3 and 4 present world trends of output 
growth volatility and review its determinants. Section 5 discusses factors that contributed to 
the reduction in output growth volatility in East Asia, and factors that could further reduce it. 
Section 6 concludes.     
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Output growth volatility reduces people’s welfare through its effect on the labor market, 
earnings, and consumption. Households, in particular poor ones, have limited capacity to 
insure against shocks. Their  earnings  and consumption patterns follow therefore closely 
overall macroeconomic trends, increasing in good times, and decreasing in bad ones, leading 
to a strong macro-economic correlation between output growth volatility and consumption 
volatility (Figure 3). Volatile consumption patterns have a strong impact on households’ 
welfare, who would rather face a smooth path of consumption that an unpredictable one. 
Among others, Reis (2006), based on Lucas’ (1987) approach, shows that the welfare costs 
of output fluctuations in the United States amount to 5 percent of per capita consumption. 
And in developing countries, where fluctuations are of larger magnitude and shocks are more 
persistent, the welfare costs of output fluctuations are even higher. The World Bank (2000), 
for instance, using  an approach based on Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000), reports 




Figure 3: Volatility of Output Growth vs. Volatility of Consumption 
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Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Volatility is measured as 




Output growth volatility also  affects  particularly  poor households because of coping 
strategies that have long-term harmful consequences. Households’ preference for “smooth” 
consumption patterns is not only a matter of taste. The very limited ability of poor     
  7 
households to insure against shocks makes them often adopt coping strategies in bad times 
that can have harmful consequences in the long term, even for generations. In times of crisis, 
poor households are not able to feed anymore infants with the nutrients they need, which 
affects their long term development prospects; pull children out of school; and sell assets, 
such as their house or farm land, initiating a vicious spiral towards increased destitution.
5
Finally, macroeconomic volatility has also proven to have a negative and robust impact on 
economic growth, and thus on future consumption. Output growth volatility is negatively 
correlated with economic growth (Figure 4), and several studies have proven the existence of 
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 The link between volatility and growth remains strong for East Asia as 
well: our estimates indicate that if the standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita 
GDP in East Asia would decrease from 1.4 percent (the volatility in the period 1996-2000) to 
0.9 percent (the average level observed in OECD countries over the same period), the growth 
rate would increase by 0.48 percentage points. 
 
 
Figure 4: Volatility of Output Growth vs. Average Growth 
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Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. For a definition of crisis volatility see Box 1. 
                                                 
5 See, among others, Ravallion, 2008, and Grosh et al., 2008, for a review of coping strategies. 
6 Ramey and Ramey’s (1995) were the first to document empirically the negative relationship between volatility 
and growth. This link was explored further in Fatàs (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2003), and Hnatkovska and 
Loayza (2005). The negative effect of macroeconomic volatility on long term economic growth acts for instance 
through increasing economic uncertainty, which reduces investment and tightens binding investment 
constraints. See Aizenman and Pinto (2005) and Wolf (2005) for a -review.     
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3  MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY: TRENDS 
 
 
During the past 20 years output growth volatility has decreased in almost every region in the 
world, including East Asia (Figure 1). World volatility has fallen from an average of 3.8 
percent in the 1970s, to 2.7 percent nowadays.
7
                                                 
7 As reported by the IMF in the 2007 World Economic Outlook. Volatility is measured using a  weighted 
average of a 10-year rolling window of countries’ GDP standard deviation. Weights consist of average GDP per 
capita in 2000 US$. 
 The decrease has been even more marked for 
non-OECD East Asia, where output growth volatility has decreased from 7.85 percent in the 
1970s, to 2.35 percent in 2006. The reduction in macroeconomic volatility began at a very 
strong pace in the 1970s, slowed down in the 1980s and 1990s (a spike can be even observed 
during the financial crisis in the late nineties), but gained momentum again at the beginning 
of the new century driving current volatility below pre-1997  crisis levels  (Figure 1). 
However, despite the large decline in recent years, average output growth volatility in non-
OECD East Asia remains significantly higher than in OECD countries, but slightly lower 
than the world average for non-OECD countries. 
One of the striking features of reduced volatility in East Asia is that the process happened 
in countries at different levels of economic development. As shown in Figure 5, the decrease 
in output volatility has been observed in high, middle, and low-income countries. The most 
striking reduction in output growth volatility can be observed among high-income  non-
OECD East Asian countries, where volatility is now less than a third of what it was in the 
1960s  and close to OECD levels (below 2 percent). The performance of middle-income 
countries is also remarkable, with the most marked reduction happening in the post-financial 
crisis years. In contrast, in the last twenty years low-income East Asian countries did not 
make significant progress in reducing output growth volatility, which remains high (4.23 
percent). 
Output growth volatility is computed using a 5 or 10 years rolling window, hence it is too 
early to assert the impact of the current financial crisis. Nonetheless, to the extent that 
economic growth already slowed significantly in most East Asia economies, the crisis is 
bound to raise volatility – making it even more important to mitigate the impact of external 
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Low Income Middle Income OECD
1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-06  
 
Volatility is measured as the group’s average (weighted by GDP) of the standard 
deviation of output growth. OECD: Korea (Rep), New Zealand, Australia, Japan. 
High Income Non-OECD: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Singapore,  Hong 
Kong.  Middle Income: Philippines, China, Thailand, Malaysia, Fiji, Indonesia, 
Kiribati. Low Income: Solomon Islands, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea. 
 
 
World crisis volatility, which captures the frequency of major crises (Box 1), has also 
declined from an average of more than 4 percent of total volatility at the end of the 1970s, to 
less than 1 percent at the beginning of the new century (Figure 1). However, the decline has 
been unevenly distributed: during the period considered, OECD countries have almost lived 
without crisis volatility, and in China crisis volatility seems to be a matter of the past (i.e. the 
1960s and 1970s); in contrast, in the Pacific islands major crises are a recurrent problem 
happening in almost every decade (e.g. Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea 
and Fiji); and for a third group of countries it is a new phenomenon, closely related to the 
1997 financial crisis (e.g. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia). 
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Box 1: What is Crisis Volatility? 
 
We define “crisis volatility” as the portion of the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth that 
corresponds to downward deviations below a certain threshold (in our case, the world average 
standard deviation of output growth; see Figure 6). Crisis volatility is designed to capture major drops 
in output growth, in contrast with the standard deviation of output growth that also captures small 
variations. To put it differently, while the standard deviation of output growth (i.e. “volatility”) may 
capture mostly high frequency variations of limited magnitude, the crisis volatility only captures 
major output drops (for more details see also Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2004). 
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Indonesia Growth Rate World average growth (mu)
Upper Bound Lower Bound
"Crisis Volatility"
 
Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Crisis volatility 
measures the portion of the standard deviation of per capita GDP 
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4  MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY: DETERMINANTS 
 
 
Most of the decline in output growth volatility can be explained by improved domestic 
structural features, more stable macroeconomic policies and, until the current financial crisis 
hit, a lower frequency of external and exogenous shocks. In particular, the literature studying 
output growth volatility has identified three main sources of volatility: (i) domestic structural 
features that affect the ability of the economy to absorb shocks;  (ii)  domestic shocks 
generated by self-inflicted policy mistakes and weak institutions; and (ii) external shocks 
such as “sudden stops” of capital inflows, large changes in the international terms of trade, 
and volatility of main trading partners. Next, we review these factors in detail and their 
trends in East Asia. 
 
 
Improved Domestic Structural Features 
Domestic structural features, such as institutions, the sophistication and depth of financial 
markets,  technology  and  business practices, not only affect  countries’  ability  to absorb 
shocks, but can also induce or magnify them. Deaton and Miller (1996), Hoffmaister, Roldós, 
and  Wickham (1998), and Raddatz (2005, 2007), among others, all find that internal 
conditions and domestically induced shocks explain a large share of output fluctuations in 
poor countries. Improved institutions, deeper financial markets, and more stable 
macroeconomic policies have all played an important role in reducing volatility in East Asia 
and all over the world. 
 
Improved Institutions 
Greater institutional quality tends to be associated with increased capacity of adjusting to 
major economic shocks, and  lower output growth volatility. Acemoglu  et al. (2003), for 
instance, document a strong relationship between the quality of institutions and volatility, 
with countries that inherited worse institutions having a higher probability of suffering high 
volatility and economic crises. They motivate the findings by suggesting that societies with 
better institutional quality  are expected to experience less internal conflicts, hence 
governments are able to pursue more enduring and less volatile policies. 
Since the 1960s East Asian countries  have significantly  improved overall institutional 
quality, which remains nonetheless well below the OECD average (Figure 7). There exist 
various datasets providing quantitative measures of institutional quality. The one used in this 
study is the Polity IV (2004), which looks at the quality of checks and balances in place on 
the executive branch of the government. It shows that, on average, non-OECD East Asia 
improved its institutional quality score from 2.2 in the 1960s, to 3.8 nowadays. Although this 
represents a significant improvement, overall institutional quality remains fairly low (the best 
institutional quality in the Polity IV dataset is 7), and even nowadays remains lower than 
institutional quality of OECD countries in the sixties. Moreover, most of the progress     
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1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-05  
Sources: author’s calculations using Polity IV (2004) data. The 
variable is the unweighted average for the region.  
 
 
Increased Sophistication and Depth of Financial Markets 
More sophisticated and developed financial markets improve the economy’s capability to 
reallocate resources where needed in case of shocks, and therefore dampen output growth 
volatility.  More developed financial markets also have a direct beneficial effect on 
consumers by allowing greater smoothing of consumption. Figure 8 presents a scatter plot of 
output  growth  volatility versus financial depth,  measured as the  ratio of private sector 
domestic credit to GDP. It shows a clear relationship between the depth of financial markets, 
and output growth volatility. Using more sophisticated econometric techniques, Loayza and 
Raddatz (2006), among others, find that domestic financial depth has an important role in 
stabilizing the economy, and can reduce the impact of shocks by up to 1.5 percentage points. 
Financial markets have significantly deepened in both OECD and developing countries, 
and East Asia followed the trend (Figure 9). In non-OECD East Asia, domestic credit as a 
percentage of GDP rose from less than 50 percent in the 1970s to more than 100 in 2006, and 
now stands significantly higher than in other non-OECD countries. Improvements have 
however been heterogeneous, with some countries developing their financial markets at a 
much higher pace than others. 
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Sources: author’s calculations using WDI data. Output Volatility is 
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Sources: author’s calculations using WDI data. Domestic Credit 





Traditionally, the literature has identified trade openness as an important factor affecting 
volatility (Figure 10).
8
                                                 
8 While the positive association between trade openness and volatility has been repeatedly found, there is an 
ongoing empirical debate regarding the connection between financial openness and output growth volatility (see 
Box 2). 
 Trade openness can lead to higher volatility through several channels: 
it increases, for instance, concentration and specialization in production through dynamic 
comparative advantage, so that countries suffer to a greater extent when international prices     
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of the goods they produce fluctuate; moreover, larger trade openness also magnifies the 























































































































Figure 10: Trade openness and output growth volatility 
 
Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Trade 




The impact of trade openness on volatility is particularly large for low and middle-income 
countries. O’Donnell (2001), for instance, finds that the positive link between trade openness 
and volatility holds for non-OECD countries, but that the effect is reversed for OECD 
countries, which tend to have a more diversified production structure. A similar result is 
establish by Calderón et al. (2008), who find that trade openness increases volatility, but 
show that the result is only relevant for low-income countries. The non-linearity of the 
relationship between trade openness and volatility can explain why some studies find the 
opposite result, i.e. that trade openness reduces output volatility (Cavallo, 2005), in particular 
in high-income countries that have diversified production and where trade openness may act 
as a shock absorber (Martin and Rey, 2006; Cavallo and Frankel, 2004). 
In the last decades East Asian countries have faced a striking increase in trade openness. 
The average trade volume for non-OECD East Asia is more than one and a half the OECD 
trade volume (78 versus 45 percent of GDP), and is 20 percent higher than the average trade 
volume of other non-OECD countries (Figure 11). While this high trade volume strongly 




                                                 
9 See, among others, Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000), O’Donnell (2001), Kose et al. (2003), Cavallo (2005), 
Giovanni and Levchenko (2006), Loayza and Raddatz (2006), and Calderón et al. (2008).     
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1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-05  
Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Trade 
openness is the group’s average (unweighted) of the ratio of total 
trade to GDP for the year 2005. 
 
 
Improved Macroeconomic Policies 
One of the most relevant  sources of domestic shocks is poor management of fiscal and 
monetary policies. Erratic macroeconomic policies, leading to volatile public consumption 
growth and inflation volatility, have been repeatedly proven to be a major source of output 
volatility. 
Several econometric studies find that a more stable fiscal policy lowers output 
fluctuations. Among others, Fatás and Mihov (2006) and Loayza et al. (2006) find a positive 
causal link between fiscal volatility and output growth volatility, and argue that a more stable 
fiscal policy can help diminish, or at least not amplify, output fluctuations. Accordingly, East 
Asia displays a markedly high correlation between the volatility of fiscal policy and output 
growth volatility (0.89; see Figure 13), and econometric evidence shows that significant part 
of that correlation stems from the causal link from volatile fiscal policies to output growth 
volatility (see next section). It is worth observing that what causes increased output growth 
volatility is likely to be the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies. Instead of being a-cyclical or 
counter-cyclical (assisting people by means of higher spending in times of crises), Gavin and 
Perotti (1997) and others have shown that in  most  developing countries fiscal policy is 
generally pro-cyclical (that is, expanding in booms and contracting in recessions), 
aggravating both output and consumption volatility, and Talvi and Végh (2005) find that the 
correlation between the cyclical component of government consumption and GDP is positive 
for every single of 36 developing countries in their sample (with an average of 0.53), among 
which are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (see also Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2009). 
The volatility of fiscal policy in non-OECD East Asian countries has decreased by more 
than half between the 1970s and 2000s (from a quite high 6.89 percent in the 1970s, to 2.91 
percent in the 2000s). It is now close to the non-OECD world average (2.88 percent), but still 
remains far above the OECD average (1 percent). Improvements in fiscal policies have been 
observed in all groups of countries (i.e. high, middle, and low-income countries). 
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Box 2: What about financial openness? 
 
Economic models have traditionally identified financial markets as the most important shock absorber 
because they help diversifying macroeconomic risk and shifting resources where they are most 
needed. Evidence remains however inconclusive. While, among others, O’Donnell (2001), Loayza 
and Raddatz (2007), and Calderon et al. (2007) find evidence that financial openness helps countries 
reduce their growth volatility, Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2000) do not find a significant impact of 
financial openness on output growth volatility. 
 
Our estimations lean towards a beneficial impact, as they find that more openness to financial markets 
reduces output growth volatility. Our data show that East Asian countries have improved their 
financial openness although they remain below OECD levels (Figure 12), and that such an 
improvement has contributed to lower output growth volatility by an average of 7.6 percent. 
 


































1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-05  
Sources: author’s own calculations using Lane and Millesi-
Ferretti (2007). Financial openness  is measured as the 
unweighted group’s average of the sum of Assets and Liabilities 
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Figure 13: Output growth volatility and volatility of Government 





































Output Volatility Volatility of Government Spending  
Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Volatility of 
Government spending is measured as the weighted average 
standard deviation of detrended government consumption growth 




Improved monetary policies have also played a significant role  in stabilizing output 
fluctuations all over the world. Volatility of inflation and output growth volatility have a 
strong tendency to move together  (Blanchard and Simon, 2001), and unsound monetary 
policy can strongly amplify or dampen fluctuations: for instance, the 1970s were both years 
of high output and inflation volatility, and of poorly performing monetary policies (Romer 
and Romer, 2002; Bernanke, 2004). In East Asia the association between volatility of 
inflation and output growth volatility is quite high (0.75), and the significant decrease in 
inflation volatility between the 1980s and the 2000s has contributed to lowering output 
growth volatility (Figure 14): at almost 20 percent, volatility of inflation in non-OECD East 
Asian countries was far above the world average in the 1970s, but thanks to sound monetary 
policies it decreased rapidly close to OECD levels by the end of the 1970s until the mid 
nineties, where a spike can be observed as a consequence of the 1997/98 financial crisis. 
Gains have been nonetheless more pronounced for high and middle income countries, while 
low income countries did not manage to reduce as much volatility of inflation (Figure 15). 
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Figure 14: Output growth volatility and volatility of inflation in 



































Volatility of Inflation Output Volatility
Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Volatility of 
inflation is measured as weighted average of the standard deviation 
of CPI growth using a five year window. 
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OECD: Korea, Rep., New Zealand, Australia, Japan. High 
Income non-OECD: French Polynesia, New Caledonia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong. Middle Income: Philippines, China, 




Lower Frequency of External and Exogenous Shocks 
While countries have some leverage in reducing the frequency and magnitude of internal 
shocks, they are also subject to external shocks upon which they have little control – whose 
frequency nonetheless reduced in the last decade. These external shocks, such as terms of 
trade shocks, fluctuations in international interest rates, and aid volatility, also contribute 
considerably to the volatility of output growth, particularly in developing countries (see, for     
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instance, Mendoza, 1995, and Calvo, 1998). The frequency of these external shocks lowered 
in the last decade,  at times significantly,  having a beneficial impact on output growth 
volatility.
10
Terms of trade shocks affect in particular output volatility of small open economies, although 
the magnitude to which they do so is subject to debate  as it often  depends on the 
methodology used  to estimate it.
 Next, we review these shocks. 
 
Volatility of Foreign Growth 
With the world becoming  more  integrated  and  open to trade,  economies  have been 
increasingly influenced by growth of their trading partners. Growth rate of trading partners 
has a significant effect  on the growth performance of an open economy. Arora and 
Vamvakidis (2005), among others, find that a 1percent increase in economic growth of the 
countries’ trading partners leads to higher domestic growth by 0.8 percentage points. By the 
same token, growth volatility of trading partners ought to influence output growth volatility, 
a link documented by Calderón et al (2006). While the world decrease in output growth 
volatility in the last decades has benefited East Asian countries, it should therefore come as 
no surprise that their high openness to trade has kept them vulnerable to external fluctuations 
that can worsen volatility during “bad” times, such as the current financial crisis. 
 
Volatility of terms of trade 
11
                                                 
10 Stock and Watson (2002), for instance, analyzing the experience of the G7 countries, find that with the 
exception of Japan the widespread reduction in volatility is in large part associated with a reduction in the 
magnitude of common international shocks. 
11 Calibrations, such as the ones by Mendoza (1995) and Kose (2002), find that terms of trade disturbances can 
explain from 56 to 88 percent of aggregate output fluctuations. These are however simulations that do not 
consider the correlation of terms of trade shocks with other variables. On the other end, studies based on vector 
auto-regressions (VAR) find a much smaller impact, varying from 6 to 15 percent (see, for instance, Ahmed and 
Murthy, 1994, Hoffmaister and Roldós 1997, and Hoffmaister, Roldós and Wickham, 1998). 
  Magnitude notwithstanding,  the long-term observed 
decrease in the volatility of terms of trade growth (Figure 16) contributed to lowering East 
Asia’s output growth volatility, but the recent fluctuations in commodity prices are likely to 
have reversed that trend. 
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Sources: author’s own calculations using WDI data. Volatility is 
measured as the standard deviation of terms of trade growth using a 
five year window. 
 
 
Sudden Stops and Interest Rate Shocks 
Shocks such as sudden stops where investors rapidly pull their money out of the country 
affect the terms at which companies and households can get access to credit, increasing 
uncertainty and causing macroeconomic volatility. In emerging markets  sudden stops in 
financial flows are the most damaging external shock (Becker and Mauro, 2006), although, 
overall, internal shocks appear to have a much larger impact on volatility than external ones. 
Large interest rate shocks can also lead firms towards distress or bankruptcy. In addition to 
making credit, and thus investment, more expensive, adverse interest rate shocks can reduce 
the tolerance of financial institutions towards risk, excluding groups of borrowers from 
borrowing, and intensifying output growth volatility. Since firms are interrelated by complex 
credit relationships, bankruptcy of one firm can also generate “bankruptcy chains” with bad 
adverse effects (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000). The volatility of international interest 
rates has however fallen progressively since its 1970s peak (Figure 17). The rolling 5-year 
standard deviation of monthly Federal funds effective rate has fallen progressively since its 
1970s peak. Nonetheless, between 2000 and 2004 it experienced a surge of more than 2 
percent, from which it has not yet recovered. 
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Source: author’s own calculations using data from the Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release. Volatility is measured as the standard 
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5  REDUCING EAST ASIA’S VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS 
 
The significant drop in growth experienced by most East Asian countries in the face of the 
financial crisis, joint with a more volatile external environment, are bound to increase output 
growth  volatility in the medium term.
12
Domestic factors that lowered volatility include  improved institutional quality, more 
stable monetary policies, and better fiscal management. Efforts made to enhance institutional 
quality paid off by increasing overall stability of GDP growth (Figure 18). Large reductions 
have also been achieved thanks to more stable monetary policies and better fiscal 
 Based on cross-country regression estimates this 
section looks at which factors have contributed to lower output growth volatility in East Asia, 
and draws  lessons about  factors that could help mitigating the impact of the crisis by 
lowering volatility further. 
 
 
Which Factors Contributed to the Long-term Decline in Volatility? 
 
The previous section reviewed individually channels that have been proven to affect output 
growth volatility, but failed to analyze the importance of each factor in East Asia’s long-term 
decline in volatility. In this section we address this issue by means of cross-country 
regression  estimates. Our estimations are based on cross-country dynamic panel General 
Method of Moments (GMM) regressions, as well as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as a 
robustness check. Results reported in this section are from Column 2 of Table A1 in the 
Appendix. Although not a perfect fit, our estimations do a fair job in forecasting the decrease 
in output growth volatility. The biggest gap between our model and the data is China: 
between the 1980s and 2000-05, China experienced a decrease in output growth volatility of 
more than 60 percent, whereas our model predicts a decrease of slightly more that 40 percent. 
In accordance with the reviewed literature,  our regressions show that  an increasingly 
stable international economic outlook  contributed significantly to the overall decline in 
volatility. We estimate that higher stability in trading partners’ rate of growth and lower 
volatility of terms of trade shocks  are  responsible for more than fifteen percent of the 
decrease in output growth volatility  (Figure 20):  the  long-term  decline in output growth 
volatility of trading partners countries (weighted by trade volumes) helps explaining more 
than 7 percent of the decrease in volatility in East Asia between the 1980s and 2005, and the 
overall decrease in volatility of terms of trade reduced further output growth volatility by 3.9 
percent (in non-OECD East Asian countries, terms of trade growth volatility has decreased 
from 6.8 percent in the 1970s to 3.3 in the 2000s, and before the crisis was lower than 
average volatility in OECD countries: see Figure 14).  
                                                 
12 As computing volatility requires observations over several years, the impact of the current financial crisis will 
be precisely known in a few years from now only.     
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management. In some countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, lower and more stable 
inflation followed the adoption of inflation targeting (adopted in the second quarter of 2000 
and 2002,  respectively),
13  which  helped  building  credibility and anchoring  inflation 
expectations more rapidly and durably.
14  Overall,  we estimate that in middle-income 
countries  lower volatility of inflation decreased output growth volatility by more than 8 
percent (Figure 18). The complement of more stable monetary policies has been sound and 
stable fiscal policies, which generated a decrease in output growth volatility in almost every 
country. For example, in 2001 Indonesia started a plan of fiscal consolidations and a 
restructuring of the financial markets, and in China a proactive fiscal policy was adopted in 
1998 to counteract the negative impact of the 1997 financial crisis.
15 These efforts have paid 
off: our estimations find that the overall decrease in volatility of government spending from 
its 1970s level (6.89 percent) to the 2000-2005 levels (2.91 percent) has helped reduce 
overall output growth volatility by 5.2 percent.
16
                                                 
13 The Bank of Thailand formally adopted inflation targeting in May 2000 (see Charoenseang and Manakit 
(2007) for more details on the effect of the change in monetary policy in Thailand, and Ito and Hayashi (2004) 
for an analysis of Inflation Targeting in Asia). 
14 There are several papers in support of this argument, for a review see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). 
15 See Goodfriend and Prasad (2005) and Boediono (2005) for details on reforms in China’s monetary and fiscal 
policy and the stabilization plan in Indonesia. 
16  As previously mentioned, existing  literature also finds that increased depth of financial markets has 
contributed to the decline in volatility. We refrain however from estimating the impact as in our regressions 
financial depth carries a statistically insignificant coefficient. 
 
Finally, our estimations confirm that one of the main sources of vulnerability in East Asia 
remains its high openness to trade. East Asian countries are markedly more open to trade 
than OECD countries. The average trade volume for non-OECD East Asia is more than one 
and the half the OECD trade volume (78 versus 45 percent of GDP), and is 20 percent higher 
than the average trade volume of other non-OECD countries (Figure 11). While this high 
trade volume strongly contributes  spurring  East Asian growth, it also makes East Asian 
countries more vulnerable to external shocks: we estimate that if trade volumes would have 
remained at their 1980s  levels, output growth volatility would be about 9  percent lower 
(Figure 18).  
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Figure 18: Estimated contributions to the decrease in volatility: middle 






















Source: Author’s own calculations using data from WDI, IMF and Polity 
IV. For each variable, EAP is the average of China, Indonesia, Thailand, 




Mitigating Upward Pressures on Volatility from the Financial Crisis 
 
While trade openness majorly contributed to the East Asian economic success, it created at 
the same time a channel through which external volatility gets transmitted (Table A1). In the 
face of the financial crisis, East Asian countries should act therefore on the domestic front 
and improve domestic factors that have proven to mitigate volatility. Our regression results 
suggest that improvements in the quality of institutions up to the average level of OECD 
countries would reduce volatility by an additional  6 percentage points  in both low and 
middle-income countries (Figure 19). Further improvements in monetary and fiscal policies 
could also help: in middle-income countries, bringing inflation volatility to median OECD 
levels could reduce output growth volatility  by a further 14.6 percent, and by  bringing 
volatility of government spending to median OECD levels (0.99 percent, i.e. Germany for the 
period 2000-2005) output growth volatility could be reduced by an additional 20.7 percent 
(Figure 19). Interestingly, low-income countries present a similar pattern, with improvements 
in monetary and fiscal policies achieving the highest impact. These estimates are indicative 
as  they represent improvements of  fictitious countries  with  average characteristics, but 
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Figure  19: Estimated reduction in volatility if determinants were 
brought at OECD levels 
 



































Trade Openness Volatility of TOT
 
Middle income Non-OECD:  average of China, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia and the Philippines vs. average OECD levels in 2000-05. Low 
income non-OECD: average of Lao PDR, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, and Vietnam. The bars represent the estimates’ standard 
deviation. Source: Author’s own calculations using data from WDI, IMF 
and Polity IV. 
 
 
Determinants that reduce overall volatility are also found to reduce the likelihood of major 
crises. Our estimations show that improved monetary and fiscal policies, for instance, reduce 
both “regular” and crisis volatility (Table A.1), hence further improvements would likely 
help preventing the likelihood of transmission of major crises events. In addition, it also 
appears  that  for crisis volatility  improvements in the regulation and supervision of the 
Banking sector would reduce the likelihood of a major crisis (Figure 20), something not 
observed for “regular” volatility. Given the nature of the current crisis, and strains in the 
Banking sector that some countries such as Cambodia are currently facing, it is vital to 
rapidly improve prudential supervision and create fast response plans for handling banking     
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problems. The central bank role as lender of last resort coordinated with bank supervision 
and deposit insurance are key elements for averting bank runs. In addition, improved 
financial depth would also allow a better allocation of resources where and when needed, 
generating a beneficial impact on volatility. 
 
 
Figure 20: Estimated reduction in Crisis Volatility if determinants 




























Average of China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines vs. 
average OECD levels in 2000-05. The bars represent the estimates’ 
standard deviation. Source: Author’s own calculations using data from 
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6  CONCLUSIONS: FACING THE PRESENT CHALLENGES 
 
While East Asian countries successfully managed to reduce output growth volatility in the 
past decades, the ongoing crisis is putting renewed pressure on volatility. The more volatile 
international environment is having strong repercussions on domestic  macroeconomic 
stability, and is unlikely to reverse soon to pre-crisis levels. The majority of forecasts predict 
lower growth and higher volatility in most high-income  countries, which will have a 
significant impact on the economic performance of East Asian economies. 
The potential impact of the financial crisis is particularly relevant for East Asian countries 
because of their higher openness to trade  and  less developed  financial markets.  The 
expansion of trade through domestic liberalization under the auspices of the GATT and WTO 
has been remarkable in East Asia, and while the process has been a key driver of economic 
growth, it also makes East Asia more vulnerable to external shocks. 
To cope with these events and help reduce output growth volatility, there needs to be 
improvements in domestic structural factors that reduce volatility. The paper identified three 
main domestic sources of volatility that could be further improved: financial stability, 
institutional quality, and monetary and fiscal policies. First, advancements could be made to 
improve financial stability.  It is urgent to improve prudential supervision and create fast 
response plans for handling banking problems. The central bank role as lender of last resort 
coordinated with bank supervision and deposit insurance are key elements for averting bank 
runs. Moreover, improved financial depth would also allow a better allocation of resources 
where and when needed with a beneficial impact on volatility. Second, in some countries the 
quality of institutions could also be improved. It is central that parliaments have strong 
control over the executive, to prevent it from deviating from medium term plans and to avoid 
continuous shifts in fiscal policy. Finally, stable monetary and fiscal policies are essential 
instruments to reduce output growth volatility. In that context, medium-term monetary and 
fiscal frameworks could be developed to better steer these instruments and provide policy 
makers with a benchmark and a target for monetary and fiscal policies.
17
                                                 
17 Mid-term policy frameworks have been used with great success in Australia and New Zeland, but also in 
China. Australian monetary policy, for example, was consolidated into a medium-term inflation targeting 
regime in 1993.  
  If the policy 
framework is credible it will help fixing inflation expectations and reduce uncertainty about 
the future, which is crucial to help reduce variability in the economic cycle. In that context, it 
is imperative that central banks reach and keep independence from the political power – and 
since it is difficult to achieve good monetary policy under poor fiscal policies, there is a need 
for active dialogue between monetary and fiscal actors. 
     




A.   Tables  
 
 
Table A1: Cycle volatility and crisis volatility 
Sample: 80 countries 1966-2005 (5-year period observations) 
Dependent variable:  Standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita 
Estimation Method: OLS and Arellano and Bover (GMM) 
OLS GMM OLS GMM
-0.034*** -0.032* -0.019 -0.028
(2.75) (1.76) (0.96) (1.51)
0.137*** 0.131*** 0.174*** 0.185***
(4.17) (3.26) (3.43) (4.38)
0.141*** 0.142*** 0.095*** 0.190***
(4.39) (3.97) (2.68) (5.48)
0.331 0.314 2.483** 3.107***
(0.49) (0.67) (2.29) (4.36)
-0.028 -0.039 -0.1 -0.003
(0.77) (0.72) (1.37) (0.05)
0.095** 0.203** 0.058 0.454***
(2.25) (2.11) (1.29) (3.38)
0.028* 0.049*** 0.065*** 0.079***
(1.70) (2.83) (4.30) (5.71)
0.152 0.249** 0.061 0.224**
(1.46) (2.44) (0.46) (2.27)
0.094* -0.016 0.240*** 0.142***
(1.79) (0.43) (4.02) (3.29)
Observations 607 607 607 607
R-squared 0.33 0.27
Number of Country  80 80
Number of Instruments 56 56
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.000 0.001
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.66 0.326
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 0.176 0.666
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Institutions (Executive Constraint)
Cyclical Volatility Crisis Volatility
Financial Depth
# of years under a systematic banking crisis
Volatility of Government Spending
Volatility of Inflation
Standard deviation of Foreign capital flows 
to the region
Standard deviation of Foreign Growth
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Table A2: Determinants of output growth 
Sample: 80 countries 1966-2005 (5-year period observations) 
Dependent variable:  Growth rate of GDP per capita 
Estimation method: OLS and Arellano and Bover (GMM) 
OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM
-0.565*** -1.237*** -1.476*** -1.546***
(3.32) (11.96) (15.33) (32.34)
-0.676*** -0.582*** -0.676*** -0.782*** -0.639*** -0.919***
(4.18) (3.32) (4.17) (5.25) (4.43) (7.53)
1.607*** 2.722*** 1.531*** 2.858*** 1.320*** 2.600***
(6.66) (6.63) (6.23) (7.41) (6.58) (11.10)
0.840*** 1.000*** 0.764*** 0.878*** 0.568*** 0.802***
(4.26) (4.43) (3.91) (4.63) (3.40) (5.56)
-0.764** -3.082*** -0.687** -2.691*** -0.776*** -1.666***
(2.49) (5.64) (2.26) (4.79) (3.01) (3.39)
-0.019*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.004 -0.001
(5.59) (6.71) (4.88) (6.98) (1.57) (0.30)
0.134 1.313*** 0.199 1.036** 0.305** 1.150***
(0.78) (2.69) (1.16) (2.20) (1.99) (3.48)
0.033 0.032** 0.034 0.028** 0.039** 0.033***
(1.24) (2.41) (1.33) (2.34) (1.99) (4.34)
0.347 0.451 0.287 -0.063 0.152 0.107
(1.02) (1.56) (0.87) (0.26) (0.52) (0.55)
0.207*** 0.186*** 0.173** 0.164*** 0.192*** 0.191***
(3.04) (4.46) (2.48) (5.79) (3.40) (4.99)
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 617
R-squared 0.32 -- 0.33 -- 0.51 --
Number of Country # code 80 80 80
Number of Instruments 59 67 67
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) 0.933 0.42 0.101
Hansen test of overid. restrictions 0.14 0.35 0.19
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
No Volatility Cyclical Volatility Crisis Volatility
Initial GDP pc (in logs)
Volatility







Growth rate of Terms of Trade
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Table A3: Average growth and volatility by decade in EAP 
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-05 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-05
Brunei Darussalam -- 4.97 -4.36 -0.37 -0.22 -- 10.92 6.55 2.00 1.47
China 2.41 4.37 7.77 9.28 8.87 13.82 3.87 3.88 2.38 0.91
Fiji 2.35 2.97 -0.33 1.60 1.78 5.21 4.51 6.58 3.57 1.87
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. -- -- 0.45 0.53 -0.13 -- -- 1.16 4.51 2.91
Guam -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Hong Kong, China 7.12 6.73 5.21 2.98 3.73 3.99 5.19 4.24 3.98 3.53
Indonesia 1.88 5.40 4.47 2.91 3.33 4.08 1.29 2.54 6.46 0.72
Cambodia -- -- -- 4.82 7.41 -- -- -- 2.61 2.64
Kiribati -- -2.18 -0.53 2.59 -0.59 -- 24.40 7.68 3.70 2.87
Lao PDR -- -- 1.49 3.69 4.55 -- -- 5.83 1.38 0.56
Macao, China -- -- 3.79 1.10 10.92 -- -- 3.52 4.71 9.67
Marshall Islands -- -- 4.17 -2.39 -0.61 -- -- 7.67 5.82 1.94
Myanmar 0.93 2.27 -0.46 5.41 8.05 7.14 2.56 5.32 3.27 4.65
Mongolia -- -- 2.66 -1.23 5.18 -- -- 3.06 5.62 2.67
Malaysia 3.47 5.34 3.17 4.57 2.38 1.33 3.07 3.44 5.13 2.54
New Caledonia 8.90 -0.99 3.65 -0.72 11.95 8.08 10.86 2.31 --
Philippines 1.82 3.06 -0.63 0.84 2.33 0.95 1.61 4.89 2.57 1.67
Palau -- -- -- -- 4.15 -- -- -- -- 1.17
Papua New Guinea 4.71 0.29 -1.27 2.32 -0.84 2.40 3.97 2.49 7.66 1.70
French Polynesia 0.13 2.07 3.09 0.44 -- 8.02 7.08 2.42 2.21 --
Singapore 7.37 7.19 4.99 4.68 2.52 5.46 2.85 3.17 3.91 4.58
Solomon Islands -0.92 1.93 3.50 -1.20 -0.82 4.36 16.41 6.41 6.24 6.91
Thailand 5.00 4.47 6.31 3.48 4.29 1.92 2.65 3.41 6.13 1.95
Timor-Leste -- -- -- 13.12 -2.92 -- -- -- -- 11.21
Tonga -- -- 2.09 2.41 2.23 -- -- 3.41 2.89 0.77
Vietnam -- -- 2.26 5.89 6.06 -- -- 1.57 1.51 0.63
Vanuatu -- -13.77 0.38 1.68 -1.51 -- -- 7.52 4.16 5.69
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Table A4: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD Min Max
Volatility of Output Growth 617 0.88 0.72 -1.03 2.87 47 0.81 0.76 -0.89 2.10
Institutional Quality 609 4.63 2.28 1.00 7.00 47 4.20 1.90 1.00 7.00
Volatility of inflation 617 1.30 1.13 -1.66 5.12 47 1.12 0.89 -0.41 3.76
Volatility of Government 
Spending 617 1.47 1.12 -1.62 4.99 47 1.62 0.70 0.17 3.28
# of Banking Crisis 617 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.18 47 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.18
Domestic Credit (% of GDP) 617 3.38 0.89 -0.02 5.40 47 3.83 0.78 2.20 5.27
Trade Openness 617 3.94 0.63 1.97 5.79 47 4.46 0.59 3.47 5.79
Volatility of TOT 612 1.67 1.55 -12.59 4.23 47 1.55 0.86 -0.70 2.93
Voltility of Foreign Growth 617 0.02 0.49 -1.54 1.04 47 0.10 0.40 -0.56 0.99
Volatility of Capital Flows 617 0.03 0.65 -1.97 1.49 47 -0.13 0.62 -1.04 1.02
Average Growth 617 1.76 2.76 -10.34 11.75 47 3.92 3.19 -3.52 10.95
Initial GDP 617 7.67 1.53 4.44 10.53 47 7.03 1.05 5.23 9.87
Education 617 3.79 0.80 0.11 5.02 47 3.76 0.58 2.44 4.41
Government Spending (% of 
GDP) 617 2.64 0.38 1.46 3.63 47 2.50 0.32 1.91 3.41
Inflation 617 15.38 31.56 -1.98 361.83 47 6.63 4.19 1.05 17.61
Growth Rate of TOT 617 -0.19 4.59 -18.86 22.03 47 -0.47 3.17 -5.55 11.49
Growth Rate of Main Trading 
Partners 617 2.38 0.91 -0.55 6.02 47 2.78 1.01 1.28 6.02
Growth rate of Capital Flows 617 3.15 2.07 -1.64 10.34 47 3.33 1.30 1.01 5.66
Crisis Volatility 617 0.42 0.95 0.00 7.55 47 0.26 0.62 0.00 2.63
World EAP
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B.   Data and Methodology 
We conducted two analogous empirical analyses. The first focuses on growth volatility which is the 
subject matter of the report, and the second on economic growth. In both cases, the dependent 
variable is constructed using the annual per capita real GDP growth rate as the main input. For growth 
volatility, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the growth rate of economic growth 
over a 5 years time period; for economic growth, the dependent variable is the average rate of growth 
over the same time period.  
 
Data 
We work with a pooled data set of cross-country and time-series observations. It consists of 80 
countries and, for each of them, at most 8 non-overlapping five-year periods spanning the 1966-2005 
period. GDP data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (2007). Our variable of 
institutional quality captures “Constraints on the Executive” as measured by Polity IV. Financial 
depth is measured as the ratio of domestic credit to GDP.  Our  measure of macroeconomic 
management is the standard deviation of the consumer price index (CPI) inflation rate. The volatility 
of fiscal policy represents the standard deviation of general real government consumption. Finally, 
trade openness represents the volume of trade (exports and imports) over GDP. All these variables are 
from the WDI (2007). Data on the volatility of the growth rate of terms of trade; volatility of the 
growth rates of main trading partners; and volatility of capital flows to the region are from the World 








  , , , t i i t t i t i X y ε η µ β + + + = (B.1) 
 
Where the subscripts i and  t represent country and time period, respectively; y is the dependent 
variable; X is a set of time- and country-varying explanatory variables that may include a lagged 
dependent variable, proxies of trade openness, measures of various external shocks, interaction terms, 
and control variables; µt and ηi denote unobserved time- and country-specific effects, respectively; 
and ε is the error term.  
For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus attention on the growth regression – which, as it contains 
a lagged dependent variable, represents the more complex case. The regression presented above poses 
some challenges for estimation. The first is the presence of unobserved period- and country-specific 
effects. While the inclusion of period-specific dummy variables can account for the time effects, the 
common methods of dealing with country-specific effects (that is, within-group or difference 
estimators) are inappropriate given the dynamic nature of the regression. The second challenge is that 
most explanatory variables are likely to be jointly endogenous with economic growth, so we need to 
control for the biases resulting from simultaneous or reverse causation.  The following outlines the 
econometric methodology we use to control for country-specific effects and joint endogeneity in a 
dynamic model of panel data. 
                                                 
18 Adapted from Loayza, Olaberria, and Rigolini (2009).     
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We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed for dynamic models of 
panel data that were introduced by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond 
(1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995). These estimators are based, first, on differencing regressions 
or instruments to control for unobserved effects and, second, on using previous observations of 
explanatory and lagged-dependent variables as instruments (which are called internal instruments). 
To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first differences of equation B.1:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) y y y y X X i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t , , , , , , , , ' − = − + − + − − − − − − 1 1 2 1 1 α β ε ε   (B.2) 
 
where we now have made explicit the presence of a lagged variable. The use of instruments is 
required to deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the problem that, by 
construction, the new error term, εi,t – εi,t–1, is correlated with the lagged dependent variable, yi,t–1 –
 yi,t–2. The instruments take advantage of the panel nature of the data set in that they consist of 
previous observations of the explanatory and lagged-dependent variables. Conceptually, this assumes 
that shocks to economic growth (that is, the regression error term) be unpredictable given past values 
of the explanatory variables.  The method does allow, however, for current and future values of the 
explanatory variables to be affected by growth shocks. It is this type of endogeneity that the method is 
devised to handle.   
Under the assumptions that the error term, ε, is not serially correlated and that the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous (that is, the explanatory variables are assumed to be uncorrelated 
with future realizations of the error term), our application of the GMM dynamic panel estimator uses 
the following moment conditions: 
 
( ) ,2 , ,1    0 it it it Ey εε −−  ⋅− =      (B.3) 
( ) ,2 , ,1    0 it it it EX εε −−  ⋅− =      (B.4) 
 
for t = 3,…, T (note that we limit the set of instruments to one lag only, while the set of possible 
moment conditions includes all available lags. We do it to avoid overfitting bias.  We return to this 
issue below). The GMM estimator based on the conditions in B.3 and B.4 is known as the difference 
estimator. Notwithstanding its advantages with respect to simpler panel data estimators, the difference 
estimator has important statistical shortcomings. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Alonso-Borrego and 
Arellano (1999) show that when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of 
these variables are weak instruments for the regression equation in differences. Instrument weakness 
influences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the difference estimator toward 
inefficient and biased coefficient estimates, respectively.
19
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the difference estimator, we use an 
estimator that combines the regression equation in differences and the regression equation in levels 
into one system (developed in Arellano and Bover, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998). For the 
equation in differences, the instruments are those presented above.  For the equation in levels 
 
                                                 
19 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator involves measurement error: differencing may 
exacerbate the bias stemming from errors in variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and 
Hausman, 1986).     
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(equation B.2), the instruments are given by the lagged differences of the explanatory variables.
20
Note that we use only a limited set of moment conditions.  In theory the potential set of 
instruments spans all sufficiently lagged observations and, thus, grows with the number of time 
periods,  T.  However, when the sample  size in the cross-sectional dimension is limited, it is 
recommended to use a smaller set of moment conditions in order to avoid over-fitting bias (see 
Arellano and Bond 1998; for a detailed discussion of over-fitting bias in the context of panel-data 
GMM estimation, see Roodman 2007).  This is our case, and therefore we use two steps to limit the 
moment  conditions.  First, as described in detail above, we use as instruments only the first 
appropriate lag  of each endogenous explanatory variable.  Second, we use a common variance-
covariance of moment conditions across periods. This results from substituting the assumption that 
the average (across periods) of moment conditions for a particular instrument be equal to zero for the 
assumption, conventional but more restrictive, that each of the period moment conditions be equal to 
zero.
  
These are appropriate instruments under the assumption that the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the country-specific effect is the same for all time periods. 
21
t i, ε
 At the cost of reduced efficiency, our two steps decrease over-fitting bias in the presence of 
small samples by accommodating cases when the unrestricted variance-covariance is too large for 
estimation and inversion given both a large number of explanatory variables and the presence of 
several time-series periods. 
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged values of the explanatory 
variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. We address this issue by considering two 
specification tests. The first is the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the validity 
of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation 
process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines 
whether the original error term (that is,   in equation B.2) is serially correlated. The model is, 
therefore, supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected.  In the system specification, we test in 
fact whether the first-differenced error term (that is, the residual of the equation in differences) is 
second-order serially correlated. First-order serial correlation of the differenced error term is expected 
even if the original error term (in levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  
Second-order serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is 
serially correlated and follows a moving average process of at least order one.  
                                                 
20  The timing of the instruments is analogous to that used for the difference regression: for the variables 
measured as period averages, the instruments correspond to the difference between t-1 and t-2; and for the 
variables measured at the start of the period, the instruments correspond to the difference between t and t-1. 
21 This uses the “collapse” option of xtabond2 for STATA.     
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